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Abstract
We perform an empirical investigation to estimate the macroeconomic cost of September 11
attacks on the United States economy. We estimate the impact of the attacks to be approximately
a 0.50 percentage point decrease in GDP growth or $60 billion. Our upper bound estimate of the
impact of September 11 is approximately twice that or $125 billion.
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1. Introduction 
 
Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson once said “Science is a parasite: the greater the 
patient population the better the advance in physiology and pathology; and out of 
pathology arises therapy.”1 The year 2001 was a particularly difficult year marked 
with corporate scandals, the headwinds of a recession, and the tragedy of 
September 11. As a matter of economic curiosity, we wish to reexamine the 
episode with hindsight of seven years to better understand the economic 
consequence of that period. While our paper cannot hope to begin to gain an 
understanding or appreciation of the human tragedy of that time period, we do 
stand to gain some scientific understanding as a result of the alliterated therapy. 
Unfortunately, estimating the consequence of September 11 using 
standard macroeconomic times series is not straightforward. For the United 
States, there were many macroeconomic shocks occurring simultaneously, leaving 
few degrees of freedom to estimate the separate impact of the attack on the World 
Trade Center. For example, there were the financial difficulties of the dot com 
bubble bursting as demonstrated by the drop in the Nasdaq which had peaked in 
March 2000 at 5,132 only to descend to 1,108 by October 2002. There were also 
significant corporate scandals epitomized by Enron’s Chief Skilling leaving in 
August 2001. Contractionary Federal Reserve Policy also placed a drag on the 
economy as the federal funds rate was increased to 6.25 percent in December 
2000, the highest rate since February of 1991. 
The shocks were not all contractionary, however. Realizing the recession 
was a serious possibility, the Federal Reserve quickly changed to an expansionary 
policy by dropping the federal funds rate to its lowest point ever or 1 percent 
through June 2003. The federal government also responded by engaging in 
expansionary fiscal policy. The Bush tax cuts of 2001-3 have been estimated to be 
$188 billion or similar in magnitude to Reagan tax cuts. 
Given these simultaneous shifts in the economic landscape, it is 
challenging to precisely estimate the macroeconomic consequence of September 
11. So, rather than attempt a direct calculation from the United States experience 
during 2001, we adopt a different empirical strategy. We appeal to other country 
experiences and compare their histories to the United States to estimate the 
economic cost of September 11. Finally, as the impact of September 11 may be 
larger than has been typically seen, we employ an upper bound estimate using the 
results from across the globe. 
To conduct our empirical investigation, we first begin by estimating the 
long-term effect of terrorism on our cross-section of countries. We do this, to 
ensure that the effects are not merely “washed-out” over time. Second, we 
                                                 
1 Quoted from his Nobel address in 1985 at Trinity University.  
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estimate the short-term effects using panel regression techniques. Finally, we 
conduct a series of robustness checks using VARs, quantile regressions, and 
welfare simulations. In this way, we are able to see how consistent our estimates 
are and what would be our upper bound estimate. 
This exercise follows a long tradition to try to understand the economic 
consequences of conflict and peace. For example, Garfinkel (1990), Grossman 
(1991), Skaperdas (1992), Hess and Orphanides (1995, 2001a,b), and Alesina and 
Spolaore (1997) have been responsible for investigating the importance of arms 
races, revolution, diversionary war, institutions, and the size of the nation-state. 
The impact of terrorist, distinct from other forms of conflict, has become a 
topic of research more recently. Most notably, Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides 
(2004) show that terrorism is indeed a drag on the economy, though not as 
significant as civil or external war. Since then there have been several papers that 
have investigated the economic impact of terrorism, most recently summarized in 
Sandler, Enders and Arce (2009). 
The results in this study concur with the previous one. However, our 
investigation also suggests that these results are more robust than we previously 
thought and slightly larger in magnitude if our upper bound estimates are to be 
taken seriously. We estimate the impact of the September 11 attacks to be 
approximately a 0.50 percentage point decrease in GDP growth or $60 billion. 
Our upper bound estimate of the impact of September 11 is approximately twice 
that or $125 billion. 
 
2. The Data and Empirical Regularities 
 
This section describes the empirical regularities of the data and their sources. The 
economic data is the Penn World Table data from Summers and Heston (1991).  
The conflict data is from ITERATE, Brecher, Wilkenfeld and Moser (1988), and 
Gurr et al (2003). 
 The “International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events” (ITERATE) 
data from Mickolus et. al. (2003) defines a transnational terrorist event:  “the use, 
or threat of use, of anxiety-inducing, extra-normal violence for political purposes 
by any individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established 
governmental authority, when such action is intended to influence the attitudes 
and behavior of a target group wider than the immediate victims and when, 
through the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its location, the nature of 
its institutional or human victims, or the mechanics of its resolution, its 
ramifications transcend national boundaries.” (Mickolus et. al., page 2.) 
ITERATE provides over 14,000 incidents of terrorism across 177 
countries from 1968 to 2003. The raw data is grouped into four broad categories 
that denote incident characteristics, terrorist characteristics, victim characteristics 
2
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and finally, life and property losses. Since we cannot control for the significance 
of individual events or identify some of the underlying information that may be 
missing, we define a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if a terrorist event is 
recorded for a given country year and 0 otherwise. 
The external conflict data are obtained from the most recent update to 
Brecher, Wilkenfeld and Moser (1988). External conflict is defined by Brecher, 
Wilkenfeld and Moser (1988) as:  “a specific act, event or situational change 
which leads decision-makers to perceive a threat to basic values, time pressure for 
response and heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities. A 
trigger may be initiated by: an adversary state; a non-state actor; or a group of 
states (military alliance). It may be an environmental change; or it may be 
internally generated.” (page 3) 
The Internal war data, obtained from Gurr et al (2003), provides data that 
originates from four broader categories to include ethnic conflict, genocide, 
revolutionary conflict and regime change which does not include nonviolent 
transitions.  As there may be some unintended overlap between the data coding 
and actual incidence of internal conflict and terrorism, we include both in our 
empirical investigation. On a cursory level, there is little evidence that the internal 
conflict data is merely an overlap of terrorism. The pair-wise correlation 
coefficient is quite small at about 0.06, once controlling for country effects, which 
gives us some comfort when considering measurement issues. As well, there 
could be strategic complementarities and/or substitutabilities among these types 
of conflict, which could either increase or lessen the effects of terrorism on 
economic activity. 
 
2.1. The Geography of Terrorist Incidents 
 
Let us return to a basic overview of the terrorism data.2  Blomberg Hess and 
Weerapana (2003) have shown that the areas of the world with the most terrorism 
are in the Americas and Europe whereas there appears to be far less terrorism in 
Africa.3 
This is usefully summarized by a map of the world (Figure 1). Each 
country has a graduated color with the darkest representing the countries with the 
most terrorist events and the lightest representing the countries with the least. The 
areas of the world that appear to be those with the most terrorism are the 
Americas and Europe whereas there appears to be far less terrorism in Africa. 
This quick snapshot may suggest that terrorism is a rich democracies 
                                                 
2 Also see Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana (2003) for additional findings of terrorism 
and income, region and governance. 
3 When the terrorism data is adjusted for population, the Middle East is also found to 
have a high incidence of terrorism. 
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problem. However, countries neighboring to high terrorist incident states such as 
the United States and Germany do not share such high incidence rates. For 
example, regions such as Canada and Scandinavia have very little if any 
terrorism. Moreover, as income and democratization increased from 1995 to 
2003, terrorism per country year actually fell. 
Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides (2004) have provided more insight into 
the empirical regularities of transnational terrorism and the economy and other 
forms of conflict. They demonstrate that, at first glance, terrorism seems to 
resemble possibly less economically significant incidents of internal war. 
Terrorism is similar to internal war in its frequency the incidence of both is 
considerably higher than that of external conflict. However, terrorism appears to 
be positively correlated with income, while internal and external conflict are 
negatively correlated. A closer look reveals that much of this relationship is due to 
country fixed effects. 
The greater incidence of terrorism in democracies and high income 
countries may be important when calculating the cost of 9/11 from the average 
impact. Hence, we will also consider quantile regression analysis that will allow 
us to examine the impact across the distribution of growth and income. In this 
way, we can examine whether the impact in the United States, a high income 
democracy, is significantly different from the average impact. As will be shown in 
subsequent subsections, the results are not sensitive to such specifications. 
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The purpose of this section is to provide our estimates employed to calculate the 
macroeconomic consequence of September 11. The section begins by first 
examining the long run implications of terrorism on growth to show that the 
effects are not “washed away” over time.  Then, we estimate the average impact 
of terrorism on growth from panel growth regressions so that we can calculate the 
economic cost of September 11. Finally, we conduct a variety of robustness 
checks using quantile regression analysis, VARs, welfare analysis and estimate 
the over different economic variables. 
We find that the incidence of terrorism in a country in a given year in the 
long run is associated with a reduction in per capita growth by less than one tenth 
of a percentage point, similar to the impact associated with internal conflict. And, 
while the impact of terrorism on growth is larger once controlling for time and 
fixed effects in panel regressions, the impact is smaller than either that of internal 
or external conflict. We estimate this impact of a terrorist event to be 
approximately a loss of 0.50 percentage points of growth for a given year. In 
addition, we provide evidence that terrorism is associated with a reallocation of 
income away from private investment spending and towards government 
spending. These estimates are not significantly different when viewed through the 
“lens” of welfare economics or quantile regression analysis. 
 
3.1. Cross Country Growth Regressions 
 
We begin these exercises by constructing our baseline model by appealing to the 
literature on economic growth. As in Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides (2004), we 
extend the standard Solow model to include a few select factors that have been 
shown to be important in determining growth. Our specification is consistent with 
previous research (see Levine and Renault (1992) for example) that shows many 
of the factors included in growth regressions are not statistically significant once 
other factors are introduced. So, once a researcher includes the relevant 
information, many theoretical results are not supported by the underlying data.  
Researchers who have then attempted to include geography or policy variables 
such as openness or institutional variables such as democracy or rule of law, have 
therefore been unable to establish a strong empirical relationship. 
Our baseline model includes investment as a share of GDP (I/Y), the log 
of initial GDP (lny0i),, a dummy for Africa (AFRICA)  and a dummy variable for 
non-oil commodity exporters (COM) found to be robust in other research [see 
Easterly and Kraay (2001)]. 
 
./= 765403210 iiiiiiiii EITYIylnAFRICACOMy εββββββββ ++++++++Δ      (1) 
 
3. Econometric Evidence 
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Croix and Doepke (2003) and employing initial values of the investment share as 
instruments. 
This is based on the reasoning that as predetermined variables which 
would be known at time t and would not have an independent impact outside of 
its contemporaneous effect. Hence, we also employ initial values as instruments. 
We adopt their approach in selecting instruments as initial values have intuitive 
appeal as being predetermined and we do not wish to turn this paper into an 
exercise on optimal instrument selection. 
Table 1 reports the results from the purely cross-sectional regressions. 
Column 1 is the base case following the growth literature. Columns 2 and 3 
sequentially include terrorism (T) and internal conflict (I). Columns 4 and 5 
include external conflict separate and then together with other forms of conflict to 
demonstrate how the different types of conflict influence growth. Columns 6 
through 10 repeat the same regressions with one change - IV/GMM is employed 
to instrument for the endogeneity of investment. 
Column 1 shows that investment has a positive impact and initial income, 
Africa and commodity exporters have a negative impact on growth. The sign of 
these effects are all quite similar to what was found in Blomberg, Hess and 
Orphanides (2004) 
 Column 2 provides our estimate on the impact of terrorism which is 
negative and statistically significant. An economic interpretation of the coefficient 
is that if a country were to experience a terrorist event in each year in the sample, 
per capita growth would drop by about 1.7 percent. To estimate the impact of one 
conflict for a given year, we must divide the coefficient by 35. Column 4 shows 
external conflict appears to have a large and negative impact, though it is 
insignificant in the long run.  Columns 6 through 10 show these results are not 
biased due to joint causality issues.  The general results hold on the impacts on 
growth using the IV/GMM specification. 
To control for possible reverse causality, we followed the suggestion in De La 
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In Table 2, we reexamine the evidence presented in Table 1 in terms of 
panel regressions. The main differences are that we control for time and fixed 
effects in the regressions; we are able to examine other sub-samples because we 
have sufficient observations; and we include one more statistically significant 
covariate—log of openness (lnop)—as it appears to be highly statistically 
significant and of the expected theoretical sign, namely.4 
 
itititititititit ZEITYIylnlnopy εφγγγγγγγ ++++++++Δ −−− 7651413110 /=                (2) 
where Z  is a set of time and country fixed effects.5 
 Column 1 shows that I/Y and lagged GDP per capita continue to be 
statistically significant with the theoretically predicted sign. The sign associated 
with Openness, lnop, is also consistent with theory. In columns 1 through 4 we 
present the coefficient on terrorism which we estimate to be larger than in the 
cross-section and we find that terrorism reduces growth by about 0.5 percent in a 
given year. Columns 5 through 10 provide the results for other sub-samples and 
the results are broadly consistent across the different categories. 
As a robustness check, we also consider the results using an alternative 
definition for terrorism, the number of incidents per capita. The results were not 
sensitive to such an extension. Moreover since researchers may be tempted to 
construct measures that will support their conjectures a priori, it is more objective 
to employ our agnostic approach regarding data construction which is done in all 
other tables. And, since the point of the paper is to investigate the impact of 
terrorism as compared to other types of conflict, redefining terrorism in per capita, 
unlike the other types of conflict, terms or by intensity of conflict may be giving it 
special treatment relative to the other forms of conflict. 
The results tell a consistent story. Terrorism appears to have a statistically 
strong negative impact on growth. This remains true even when considering other 
types of conflict and endogeneity concerns. 
To calculate the economic impact of such an effect we merely interact the 
coefficient with the dollar value of GDP in 2006 our base year. As the impact is 
not statistically relevant in previous or future years, we only calculate the impact 
of 9/11 for the year 2001. In this case, we estimate the economic cost to be $60 
billion. 
                                                 
4 As in the earlier case, we considered various institutional and policy variables with 
little statistical impact and do not show them here. As well, using instruments for 
investment and openness provided broadly similar results.  
5 Estimating the model using a random effects estimator instead of a fixed effects 
estimator does not provide any qualitative change to what is reported in Tables 4 and 5.  
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event is the same as the impact in the United States in 2001. There are many 
reasons to presume this assumption is restrictive. First, the severity of the attack 
was surely larger for 9/11 than for other attacks. Using casualties as a metric, 
2,976 died during the attack on September 11. For many of other terrorist attacks, 
there were no casualties. Second, as the incidence of terrorism is higher in high 
income democracies such as the United States, it is also possible that the impact 
in these areas is not the same as the average impact. 
One way (albeit a crude way) to estimate the impact in the United States is 
to use the upper bound confidence interval from the average estimate. In this case, 
a two standard deviation estimate from the average estimate is $125 billion. There 
are, of course, other ways to explore how different the impact was during the 9/11 
attacks. These ways are analyzed in the following subsection. 
 
 However, this presumes the average impact of an international terrorist 
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3.2. Robustness Checks 
 
In this subsection, we consider four different methodologies to see if the results 
from the previous section are fragile. First, we re-estimate the model analyzing 
different parts of the cross-national income or growth distribution. Second, we 
calculate the cost with regards to lost utility rather than only lost GDP. Third, we 
calculate the loss to components of GDP rather than only GDP itself. Finally, we 
calculate the loss using a structural VAR. In summary, we find our results 
consistent with our earlier findings that September 11 resulted in lost GDP of $60 
billion. The upper bound estimate continues to be a loss of $125 billion. 
 
3.2.1. Quantile Regressions 
 
In this subsection, we provide the results using quantile regression analysis. 
Quantile estimation is a type of regression when to estimate of the various 
quantiles (such as the median) of a population. Since the macroeconomic impact 
of terrorism may be different on 9/11 than the average impact, we consider 
techniques that allow us to estimate the impact on different parts of the 
distribution. 
One advantage of using quantile regression to estimate the median, rather 
than the mean, is that quantile regression will be more robust in response to large 
outliers. More importantly for our purposes, we can consider other parts of the 
distribution a well. Since U.S. growth in 2001 was in the 70th percentile, we can 
consider the impact, estimating the model using absolute deviations at the 70th 
fractile. Or, if one believes that 9/11 was an extreme event, we can estimate the 
model at the 90th fractile. 
 Table 3 reports the results from this exercise. The model estimated is a 
slight extension of the model estimated in Table 2, excluding openness in some 
cases due to data limitations and including regional dummy variables in others 
due to estimation limitations that do not allow the inclusion of country fixed 
effects. Column 1 and 2 provide the baseline OLS results including 
contemporaneous terrorism and lagged terrorism in the regression. As reported 
previously, only contemporaneous terrorism is statistically significant with 
approximately a negative 0.5 percentage point impact on GDP per capita growth. 
Column 3 estimates the model using quantile regression techniques estimated at 
the median or Q = .5. Columns 4 - 7, then consider various points along the 
distribution of growth, from Q = .1, .75, .9, .95. The impact of terrorism on 
growth is negative and statistically significant at each point, though the magnitude 
rises significantly for Q = .9, .95. 
 This may be better seen in Figure 2 which depicts the estimated impact of 
terrorism on growth across the entire distribution. The solid green line depicts the  
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T A B L E  3 :  Q U A N T I L E  RE G R E S S I O N S:  L O S T  GDP D U E  T O  
T R A N S N A T I O N A L  TE R R O R I S M  AT T A C K S 
 
OLS OLS Q=.5 Q=.1 Q=.75 Q=.9 Q=.95
Tit -.446** -0.444** -0.357*** -0.14 -0.440** -0.698*** -
1 236*** [0.218] [0.212] [0.107] [0.348] [0.173] [0.229] [0.351] 
T2001 - .054       
 [0.663]       
T it_1  -0.071      
  [0.212]      
lnyit_1 -4.382*** -4.391*** -0.606*** -0.223 -0.862*** -1.184*** -
1 235*** [0.369] [0.369] [0.059] [0.190] [0.095] [0.136] [0.218] 
I/Yit_1 0.60*** 0.060*** 0.081*** 0.067** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.069*** 
 [0.017] [0.017] [0.006] [0.026] [0.010] [0.014] [0.023] 
SSAFR   -1.469*** -1.617*** -0.689** -0.301 -0.119 
   [0.160] [0.492] [0.269] [0.350] [0.551] 
LAT   -1.187*** -1.301*** -0.974*** -0.673** -1.184** 
   [0.154] [0.493] [0.250] [0.343] [0.504] 
EASIA   -0.037 -1.096* 0.218 0.009 -0.173 
   [0.182] [0.601] [0.297] [0.400] [0.643] 
MIDEAST   -1.280*** -4.909*** -1.055*** 0.677* 1.929*** 
   [0.182] [0.594] [0.296] [0.403] [0.580] 
POOR   -1.636*** -2.089*** -2.573*** -3.379*** -
3 590***   [0.162] [0.516] [0.255] [0.341] [0.539] 
RICH   0.242 1.383*** 0.027 -0.519 -0.786 
   [0.178] [0.524] [0.295] [0.409] [0.609] 
NAMER   0.004 0.052 -0.389 -0.48 -1.055 
   [0.404] [1.317] [0.654] [0.831] [1.262] 
OCEANIA   -0.675* -0.19 -0.954* -1.18 -1.805** 
   [0.360] [1.134] [0.559] [0.720] [0.868] 
Observation
s
4709 4709 4744 4744 4744 4744 4744 
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FIGURE 2: IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON GDP GROWTH ACROSS DISTRIBUTION 
 
 
 
estimate at each fractile and the graph line depicts the confidence interval. The 
dotted line is the OLS estimate. Notice that the impact of terrorism is negative in 
most of the fractiles and statistically significant once the distribution is around Q 
= .3. The slope becomes only becomes steeper around Q = .9. This means that 
OLS estimates are not that different from quantile estimates for most of the 
distribution. Figure 2 also shows the point at which the United States is in the 
distribution. It is almost exactly where the OLS estimate equals the quantile 
estimate again providing more evidence that the earlier results are not fragile. 
As the United States is in the Q = .7 portion of the distribution, one might 
argue that the impact of 9/11 is somewhere in between Q = .5 and Q = .75 which 
is similar to the OLS estimate. In this case, the economic consequence of 9/11 
would be estimated to be approximately $60 billion. However, if one believes that 
9/11 had a significant deleterious impact on growth, one might chose the upper 
bound estimate at Q = .9 or Q = .95. In this case, the impact would be similar to 
the upper bound OLS estimate of $125 billion. In summary, the results from the 
earlier section are robust to quantile regression techniques. 
 
3.2.2. Welfare Calculations 
 
This section provides utility measures in estimating the consequence of 
September 11th following Lucas (1987).  The methodology is adapted 
from Blomberg (2009). 
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Formally, we begin with a representative individual who lives in country i 
with lifetime utility described by the following equation: 
 
,
1
)(1=
1
)(
= ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+
−
−−∞∑ ρθ
ρ
ists
ts
tit
CEU                                                                            (3) 
where exp)(1= ]
2
2
1[
iis
ts
is CC ε
σεμ −−+   , isis υε =Δ  is a normal, i.i.d. mean-zero shock 
with variance 2
iεσ , and iμ  is the growth rate of consumption. Using the fact that 
isερ][1exp −  is log-normally distributed, we can then obtain: 
 { }[ ].)(/2)(1exp)(1=}{ 21))((11 tsCCE iitsiist −−−+ −−−− ρσρμ ρρρ                                   (4) 
 
where 2iσ  denotes the variance of isis ευ Δ= . Assuming that the following holds 
for all i  countries,  
 { } 1</2)(1exp)(1)(1 211 iii ρσρμθ ρ −−++≡Φ −−                                                     (5) 
 
and substituting (4) into (3), we obtain expected utility as: 
 
[ ] .1
1
= 1
1
−
−
Φ−⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
− i
i
it
CU ρ
ρ
                                                                                           (6) 
 
Instead of a world without consumption uncertainty, as Lucas (1987) 
proposed for his measure of the welfare costs of business cycles, we propose 
comparing the expected welfare from each country remaining in its realized path 
of consumption, to another synthetic path of consumption where there is no state 
of transnational terrorism. 
 Formally, to ``price'' the amount that a representative household in each 
country would pay in order to obtain the peaceful path of consumption, we return 
to Lucas' methodology.6.   In other words, we now solve for the amount of current 
consumption, 
*
iτ , that equates the expected welfare of remaining on the current 
path of consumption to one where consumption is devoid of conflict, namely:  
                                                 
6We now denote the mean and variance of the log-change of per-capita consumption in a peaceful 
world as *iμ  and *2iσ , respectively. 
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)/(1=
1
)/(1))((1
i
i
i
ii CC ρρτ
ρρ
                                                            (7) 
where { }/2)(1exp)(1)(1 *21*1* iii ρσρμθ ρ −−++≡Φ −− . 
Solving for *iτ  and assuming that *= ii CC , we have: 
1.
1 
1=
1
1
*
* −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
Φ−
Φ− −ρτ
i
i
i                                                                                               (8) 
To understand how potentially enhanced consumption growth and reduced 
consumption volatility can effect the economic welfare costs of conflict, first, 
define 2*22 iii σσσ −≡Δ  and iii μμμ −≡Δ * . A log-linear approximation of 
expression (8) in the neighborhood of 0== 2ii σμ ΔΔ  yields: 
 
[ ].)(1/2)(
1
12*
iii
i
i
i μμσρτ Δ++Δ−⋅⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
Φ−
Φ≈ −                                                            (9) 
 
Ceteris paribus, if a more peaceful world can deliver more growth and less 
volatility, each of these factors will raise the amount that a representative 
individual would pay in order to get rid of conflict. 
 In developing a baseline specification for a country’s per-capita 
consumption growth, and how conflict might affect it, the simple permanent 
income hypothesis (PIH) provides a very reasonable starting point. Hence, the 
baseline specification we adopt is: 
 
c&Δ ,= 21 ittiit eyIT ++++αα                                                                            (10) 
 
where again c&Δ  is the log-difference of per-capita consumption for country i  at 
time t , iI  and ty  are estimated individual and time fixed effects, respectively and 
T  is a terrorist event. As we do not have reliable consumption per capita data for 
the entire time sample, we employ GDP per capita data as a proxy assuming that 
the growth rate must be equated in the steady state. For the sample period 1968-
2003, over 177 countries, we estimate .397=2 −α  and find it be significant at the 
15
Blomberg and Hess: Estimating the Macroeconomic Consequence of 9/11
Brought to you by | The Claremont Colleges
Authenticated | 134.173.130.226
Download Date | 11/30/12 10:20 PM
  
0.05 percent level. As our model is suggestive of a lower bound, we employ an 
estimate of .174=2 −α  or the original estimate plus one standard error. 
From these results, one can construct a ``synthetic'' growth rate were an 
economy to be perpetually at peace as follows. From the estimated, fitted values 
of equation (10), each country's ``peaceful'' growth rate at time t  is just 
itti eyIcx ˆˆˆ=ˆ ++≡μ& . Averaging this yields each country's peaceful growth rate of 
per-capita consumption, μ&ˆ =  cxT T
t∑ 1=)(1/ . 
The construction of a synthetic measure of the volatility (either standard 
deviation or variance) of consumption during peace involves two steps: estimating 
the mean squared growth in consumption during peace and the squared mean 
growth in consumption during peace. Fortunately, the latter has been calculated, 
2* )ˆ( iμ . Hence, to insure that this volatility measure does not become negative, we 
adopt the following specification for the squared growth of per-capita 
consumption.  { }][2exp=|| 12 ittiit uyITcx ++⋅⋅ δ                                                                          (11) 
 
According to this exponential specification, the squared change in per-capita 
consumption growth will always be positive, and one can estimate the fixed 
individual and time effects and the effect of conflict on volatility using non-linear 
least squares. A more appealing approach, however, is to take natural logs of both 
sides of (11) so that one can estimate these same crucial parameters using OLS, 
namely:  
 
ittiit uyITcxlog +++1=|)(| δ                                                                                (12) 
 
Notice that one can come up with a reasonable measure of the effect of conflict on 
consumption volatility by estimating the parameters using OLS on the 
transformed dependent variable. For the sample period 1968-2003, over 177 
countries, we estimate .31=1δ  and find it be significant at the 0.05 percent level. 
As our model is suggestive of a lower bound, we employ an estimate of .145=1δ  
or the original estimate minus one standard error. 
To implement the welfare calculations embodied in expression (8), we 
need to provide parameter values for the discount rate (θ ) and the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion ( ρ ), in addition to the consumption growth and volatility 
measures calculated from above. Clearly, changes in θ  and ρ  will affect *iτ . 
Four important issues in the selection of these parameters should be kept in mind. 
First, the parameter values should be plausible. Second, the parameters should be 
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such that 1<iΦ  and 1<*iΦ  for all countries -- see expression (5). Third, the 
parameter values selected should be suggestive of a lower bound for *iτ . Fourth, 
the reader should get an indication of the robustness of *iτ  to changes in the 
values chosen for θ  and ρ . We provide results for the welfare measures using 
.08=θ  and 2=ρ  which are standard in the literature. The general qualitative 
results are not sensitive to slight deviations in θ  and ρ . 
Once this exercise has been conducted, we can compare the synthetic path 
of no terrorism to the path with terrorism. This deviation is a measure of lost 
welfare due to terrorism. What does the analysis yield? Again, we find a result 
very similar to what was found using the OLS estimates. We find the lost welfare 
in dollar terms to be approximately $80 billion. While this number is slightly 
larger than the GDP lost measure of $60 billion, it is not significantly larger. 
Moreover, given that the utility-based measure attempts to take into account lost 
welfare due to uncertainty, it is remarkable to see that the original results continue 
to be supported. 
 
3.3. Compositional Effects 
 
The central finding from the results reported above is that economic activity 
appears to be impaired by conflict. Moreover, these results suggest that the 
macroeconomic impact of 9/11 was a loss of approximately $60 billion with an 
upper bound of $125 billion. In this section, we wish to analyze which GDP 
component the process may operate concentrating on investment and government 
spending. 
The results in Table 4 show the results from these regressions. Our results 
show terrorism causes a reduction in investment as a percentage of GDP of 
approximately one half of a percentage point. Columns 1 to 4 show that the result 
is statistically significant across various specifications. The results in columns 5 
through 8, show that terrorism has the opposite impact on government spending 
as a percentage of GDP causing the spending rate to rise by approximately 0.4 
percentage points.  Terrorism appears to cause government spending to crowd in 
while terrorism appears to cause investment spending to be crowded out, leaving 
the overall compositional effect relatively small. 
 
3.4. A Structural VAR Model 
In this section, we wish to trace out the dynamic effects of 9/11 using dynamic 
panel analyses using a Structural vector auto regression (VAR).  This approach 
follows closely Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides (2004). Our abridged explanation 
here is to allow for the co-determination of the log-level of real GDP per-capita, 
as well as dummy variables for internal conflict, external 
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conflict and terrorism.7  The reduced form errors, eYt, eTt, eEt, eIt are taken from 
the output, terrorism, external conflict and internal conflict equations, 
respectively. 
We incorporate these through equation (13) which shows that GDP 
responds to all of the other shocks in a given year. 
 
tytItEtTtY
e εεαεαεα +⋅+⋅+⋅ 321=                                                                       (13) 
 
tTtItT
e εεα +⋅4=                                                                                                   (14) 
 
tEtItE
e εεα +⋅5=                                                                                                  (15) 
 
tItI
e ε=                                                                                                                 (16) 
 
Table 5 provides the estimates of the Structural VAR described above. In 
addition to providing coefficient estimates and standard errors,  the table yields 
the associated p-values from of over-identifying restrictions: p-value 1 is the p-
value from the test of the restrictions in equations (13) to (16).8   The remaining p-
values have alternative restrictions.9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The VAR also includes lagged investment and openness as exogenous right hand side variables. 
They are included to provide continuity with our panel regressions presented above. The VAR 
results are not affected by the exclusion of these variables from the analysis. The lag length for the 
VAR estimates is set at two and, as explained above, we also include fixed effects and time effects 
in the VAR. The results are robust to changing the lag length. 
8 This p-value is derived from a χ2 test with 1 degree of freedom. 
9See Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides (2004). 
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T A B L E  5 .   S T R U C T U R A L  VAR  E V I D E N C E  
 
Sample Full NONDEMO OECD AFRICA MIDEAST ASIA 
a1 -0.475* -0.765** -0.169 -1.524** 0.029 -0.316 
 [0.247] [0.379] [0.219] [0.723] [0.754] [0.372] 
a2 - 4.307*** - 6.094*** 1.243 -1.966 -2.130 - 4.615*** 
 [0.895] [1.282] [1.430] [2.327] [1.800] [1.365] 
a3 -1.267** -1.531** - 3.232*** - 2.933*** 0.889 -0.567 
 [0.525] [0.659] [1.170] [1.130] [1.617] [0.694] 
a4 7.735** 1.928*** -14.303 19.646** 23.817* -2.896 
 [3.344] [3.518] [18.505] [9.045] [13.447] [7.714] 
a5 4.188*** 5.033*** -5.760** 12.163** 5.409 2.682 
 [0.923] [1.035] [2.827] [5.765] [5.627] [2.085] 
 
p-value 1 .242 .376 .388 .567 .569 .542 
p-value 2 .000 .000 .139 .023 .222 .539 
p-value 3 .000 .000 .044 .038 .308 .195 
p-value 4 .026 .001 .477 .033 .071 .684 
p-value 5 .000 .000 .042 .035 .336 .199 
p-value 6 .035 .005 .511 .080 .177 .774 
NOBS 4019 2438 835 1267 252 592 
       
 
Notes: See Table 4. The model is from a Structural VAR presented in the text, 
equations (13) - (16). 
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Figure 3 depicts the impulse response function for our Structural VAR. 
The figure is arranged so with each column demonstrating the dynamic response 
of the row variables to a one standard deviation shock to the variable denoted at 
the top of the column. Starting from the upper most left corner, Figure 3 depicts a 
one standard deviation shock to GDP on GDP, T, E and I, respectively. Columns 
2 through 4 continue the exercise with the shocks from T, E and I, respectively. 
Along with the dynamic response, the 90 percent confidence interval is also 
plotted using the technique pioneered by Sims and Zha (1999). 
The impulse responses in Figure 3 continue to demonstrate the robustness 
of our findings—namely that terrorism has a negative and statistically significant 
impact on growth. More importantly, the impact of terrorism on growth is short-
lived—lasting approximately one year. 
The implication is that the cost of 9/11 is most dramatic in the year of the 
shock. However, we find that the shock should subside quickly. This means that 
the cost in GDP terms should not be visible beyond one year in the future. In 
short, we find again the cost of 9/11 to be approximately $60 billion with an upper 
bound at $125 billion over the lifetime of the United States economy. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This study provides three contributions for our understanding of underlying 
macroeconomic consequences of terrorism. First, the study proposes to estimate 
the long run economic growth effects associated with terrorism. To accomplish 
this task, we construct a panel data set that incorporates the economic data on 
national income and growth, IMF data on financial conditions, data on domestic 
and international terrorism incidents, and data on external and internal conflict. 
Using this unique dataset, which spans 35 years for 177 countries, we examine the 
dynamic effects of terrorism on economic growth, consumption growth, as well as 
possible effects on capital accumulation and macroeconomic instability. The 
panel dimension of this data is particularly useful as it allows identification of the 
effects of terrorism on economic activity, growth and stability that may be evident 
in long-run trends that cannot be detected absent long-horizon cross-country 
comparisons. With these added degrees of freedom across the globe, we can then 
extract the impact on the United States economy. These results suggest that the 
economic consequence of 9/11 is $60 billion in 2006 terms. 
Second, we explore the extent to which terrorism “crowds-in” and/or 
“crowds-out” alternative forms of domestic and international conflict and the 
potential differences in the macroeconomic consequences of these alternative 
forms of conflict. This is of particular interest because terrorist episodes are far 
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more frequent and persistent than are other forms of external and internal 
conflicts. While terrorism and more traditional forms of conflict are not typically 
considered as gross substitutes or complements for one another, the explicit 
consideration of this issue is essential for understanding the macroeconomic costs 
of terrorism per se, as opposed to the costs that might typically be identified with 
other forms of conflict. We find that there are indeed important complementarities 
between terrorism and other forms of conflict. 
Finally, having established the empirical properties of how terrorism 
affects economic activity as well as the extent to which terrorism affects the 
nation-specific and world-wide frequency of domestic and international conflict, 
the paper concludes by ”pricing” the macroeconomic impact of terrorism. We do 
this by comparing the original estimate of $60 billion to other estimates, doing a 
variety of robustness checks such as quantile regression analysis, structural VAR 
estimation and welfare analysis. We find that our original estimates are robust to 
the various types of estimation techniques. 
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